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HOW IS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MADE? 
Tracey E. George* 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.** 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 420. $65. 
Bismarck famously remarked: "Laws are like sausages. It's better 
not to see them being made."1 This witticism applies with peculiar 
force to constitutional law. Judges and commentators examine the 
sausage (the Supreme Court's doctrine), but ignore the messy details 
of its production. 
Maxwell Stearns has demonstrated, with brilliant originality, that 
the Court fashions constitutional law through process-based rules of 
decision such as outcome voting, stare decisis, and justiciability. Em­
ploying "social choice" economic theory, Professor Stearns argues that 
the Court, like all multimember decisionmaking bodies, strives to for­
mulate rules that promote both rationality and fairness (p. 4). 
Viewed through the lens of social choice, the Court's constitutional 
precedent becomes more coherent. Stearns aims to present an account 
that is "positive" (i.e., justifies the Court's rules based upon the his­
torical and case evidence) rather than "normative" (i.e., criticizes the 
substantive content of those rules) (pp. 6, 63-67). In particular, Stearns 
logically explains the decisions involving "standing" (i.e., whether a 
plaintiff has the right to sue), which legal scholars have uniformly con­
cluded are irreconcilable and thus reflect either intellectual sloppiness 
or unstated political motives. 
Professor Stearns's thesis is radical, for it compels us to look at 
constitutional law in an entirely new way. At the same time, however, 
his approach is conservative because it depends on the pre-Realist 
premise that constitutional "law" consists of binding legal rules that 
the justices try to interpret and apply in a principled way. Unlike many 
academics, Stearns "takes the justices' own statements of doctrine, as 
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expressed in their opinions, quite seriously" (p. 5) and attempts to jus­
tify them using social choice analysis.2 
Stearns displays a unique ability to convey extremely complex le­
gal, economic, and political ideas in a clear and precise manner. His 
work is especially valuable because it is accessible to scholars in a va­
riety of fields, and it will. force them to reconsider their analytical 
frameworks. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of Stearns's book is that he presents 
a grand unified theory of the Court's rules of constitutional process 
and the resulting development of doctrine. This strength can also be a 
weakness, however, because he tends to read precedent and the his­
torical evidence to fit his thesis, even when other explanations might 
be more persuasive. 
In this Review, we will explore two such alternatives, grounded in 
political science and constitutional theory. We hope to show that these 
disciplines are at least as effective as economics in illuminating consti­
tutional lawmaking. 
I. POSITIVE THEORIES OF APPELLATE COURT DECISIONMAKING 
Positive models of Supreme Court decisionmaking begin with the 
rational choice paradigm: that individuals make decisions that they 
believe are most likely to lead to their preferred outcomes. Political 
scientists who study appellate courts have debated the relevance of a 
court's collegial nature to its decisions. Stearns adds to this literature 
by focusing on a classical economic theory of collective decisionmak­
ing, Arrow's Theorem.3 He uses Arrow's voting paradox in both its 
normative sense (as Arrow originally proposed it) and its positive 
sense, as it has been employed by social scientists ever since.4 
2. Stearns recognizes that politics and ideology influence adjudication, but contends that 
the justices aim to resolve the dispositive case issues in a legally consistent way: "I take doc­
trine seriously not because I believe that doctrine neutrally drives case results, but rather 
because I believe doctrine serves as one of several important constraints that influence the 
manner in which justices achieve desired case outcomes." P. 5. 
3. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). 
4. Stearns attempts to distinguish between normative "legitimacy" (i.e., society's accep­
tance of an outcome because of the fairness of the procedures followed) and normative "jus­
tification" (i.e., the merits of a result as compared to foregone alternatives). Pp. 63-67. This 
argument fails to persuade within the social choice framework. He uses "normative" in the 
first instance in a different sense than it is employed in the second - process rules cannot 
produce normatively acceptable outcomes (under social choice theory) unless they are con­
sistent with the goals of decisionmaking considered by Arrow. It may be true that the public 
perceives outcomes as legitimate because. they were reached by following predetermined 
rules. This is a positive account, however, not a normative one. Whether the public should 
have this perception is a question that goes to the normative justification for the outcomes. 
Stearns's arguments about the rightness of rules that resolve the voting paradox are norma­
tive, of course. 
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Initially, we consider the central aspect of Arrow's theory of social 
choice upon which Stearns relies to create his process model. We then 
examine whether existing political science accounts of Court decisions 
provide a sounder, more tractable model. 
A. Arrow's Insights into Group Decisionmaking 
1. Introduction 
Scholarship built upon Arrow's Theorem (or its descendants) has 
traveled · under various banners, including public choice or social 
choice theory,5 but shares a herita·ge in the work of Arrow and Duncan 
Black.6 Arrow proved that no collective decisionmaking process could 
both satisfy accepted notions of fairness and produce a consistent or 
"rational" outcome, that is, one that would meet the requisites for ra­
tionality in individual decisionmaking.7 Most notably, he demonstrated 
mathematically that aggregating collective preferences according to 
democratic methods, such as majority rule, will not always yield a sin­
gle, transitive collective preference.8 As a result, the decisionmaking 
process "cycles," moving through a series of options without ever 
clearly selecting one. The result is the classic "voting paradox," first 
5. The economic theory of group decisionmaking has assumed many labels, including 
social choice, public choice, collective choice, or positive political theory. Saul Levmore, 
Preface, in MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND 
COMMENTARY xvii, xi (1997). For a discussion of the schizophrenic naming and defining of 
the school, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in 
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992) (discussing the academic debate over the precise 
meaning of the terms "public choice," "social choice," and "positive political theory," which 
clearly share "familial" connections). 
6. For the classic texts by each author, see ARROW, supra note 3; and DUNCAN BLACK, 
THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958). Daniel Farber, a legal scholar who 
has written extensively on social choice, observed: "Kenneth Arrow is undoubtedly the pa­
terfamilias of social choice theory . . . .  Arrow's Theorem is the foundation for what is now a 
huge body of literature on mechanisms of social choice." Daniel S. Farber, Positive Theory 
as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. RE V. 1565, 1573 (1995). For a law review discussion of 
Black's contribution, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and 
the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989). 
7. Arrow's "General Possibility" or Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that no 
method of summing individual preferences can satisfy basic notions of justice and fairness as 
reflected in five maxims: universal admissibility of individual preference scales, positive as­
sociation of individual and social values, independence from irrelevant alternatives, individ­
ual sovereignty, and nondictatorship. For an intriguing account of Arrow's recognition of the 
voting paradox, see his autobiographical essay in LI VES OF THE LAUREATES: THIRTEEN 
NOBEL ECONOMISTS 47-49 (William Breit & Roger W. Spencer eds., 3rd ed. 1995) (hereinaf­
ter ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES]. 
8. ARROW, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SCHAPIRO, 
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 7-8 (1994) (noting that Arrow's theory "rendered all democratic rules 
of collective decision potentially suspect" because they fail to achieve their seeming end: 
popular choice). 
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recognized by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 but largely forgotten 
until Arrow revived it.9 
Cycling is easy to illustrate. Imagine three individuals, A, B, and C, 
who must make a group decision among three options. A ranks her 
preferences 1, 2, 3; B ranks his preferences 2, 3, 1; and C ranks her 
preferences 3, 1, 2. In a pairwise vote between choices 1 and 2, choice 
1 prevails. In a vote between choices 2 and 3, choice 2 prevails. If -the 
group's preferences were rational, it would prefer choice 1 to 3, that is, 
its preferences would be transitive. In a vote between 1 and 3, how­
ever, choice 3 prevails.10 If all three individuals vote sincerely in accor­
dance with their preferences, there is no rational means of choosing 
one option, and thus there is no "Condorcet winner." No minimum­
winning majority can withstand a challenge by the losing participant, 
who can always entice one member of the majority to support a differ­
ent option. For example, if choice 1 prevails, B can persuade C to form 
a new majority in favor of choice 3. If choice 3 prevails, A can per­
suade B to shift to choice 2, and so forth. The majority cycles. 
2. Arrow's Theorem in Legal Scholarship 
While many social scientists immediately began to utilize Arrow's 
work on collective decisionmaking,11 law professors were not as quick 
to appreciate its relevance to their studies. Beginning in the mid-1970s 
and picking up speed in the last decade,12 legal scholars have sought to 
evaluate law and legal structures by considering how institutional 
characteristics influence collective choice.13 Since 1986, more than 100 
9. See ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 50 (describing his surprise 
at learning, after circulating his own work, that "[t]he paradox of majority voting had indeed 
been discovered before - in fact, by the French author the Marquis du Condorcet in 
1785!"); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCI. RE V. 1231 (1988). In 
the original book, Arrow credits E.J. Nanson with first recognizing the paradox in 1882. 
ARROW, supra note 3, at 3 n.3. 
10. The group members' preferences are "multipeaked". STE VEN J. BRAMS, 
PARADOXES IN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NONOB VIOUS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
37-41 (1976) (discussing single-peakedness and multi-peakedness as discovered by Duncan 
Black). 
11. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL v ALVES i (2d ed. 1963) 
(observing in the preface to the second edition that Social Choice and Individual Values "has 
to some extent acquired a life of its own" and thus choosing in the second edition to append 
material responding to commentary on the book, rather than rewrite the main text); 
ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 51 (describing the voluminous work 
built on social choice theory). 
12. David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal 
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659-60 (1997) (book review) ("It was not until the mid-
1970s that legal scholars first explored the implications of public choice, even though many 
of the seminal insights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in place for 
over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal literature by storm."). 
13. For example, legal scholars have invoked social choice principles to argue that the 
legislative process is inherently flawed, thereby justifying greater Supreme Court interven-
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law review articles have included "social choice" or "public choice" in 
their titles, and more than 400 articles have cited Arrow's classic text, 
Social Choice and Individual Values.14 Within the past decade, law 
journals have devoted entire issues to articles on the application of 
choice theory to the study of law .15 
Frank Easterbrook was the first legal commentator to view the de­
cisionmaking of collegial courts from a social choice perspective.16 
Since then various legal scholars have recognized that multijudge ap­
pellate courts may be subject to decisionmaking flaws predicted by so­
cial choice theory and have considered the resulting implications for 
normative adjudication theories.17 Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence 
Sager, for example, have drawn on Arrow's Theorem to examine 
whether the features of collegial courts satisfy the normative goals of 
adjudication.18 David Post and Steven Salop have argued that such 
courts should adopt a system of "issue voting" as opposed to "out­
come voting" to overcome the voting paradox.19 Steams contributes to 
this important body of work. 
tion. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (drawing in part on public choice ideas to support wide-ranging 
judicial activism under the Takings Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: 
Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980) (using interest group analy­
sis to justify more intrusive judicial review of legislation for rationality). Scholars have also 
taken the contrary position - that legislatures are as well or better suited than appellate 
courts to reach rational decisions. See, e.g. , NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: 
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Einer R. El­
hauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 
(1991). 
14. These findings are based on a search of WESTLA W JLR database. 
15. See, e.g., Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709 (1998); Sympo­
sium: Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992); Symposium on 
Public Choice and the Judiciary, 1990 BYU L. REV. 729; Symposium on the Theory of Public 
Choice, 74 v A. L. REV. 167 (1988); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997) (an edited reader supplemented with a 
discussion of economic concepts relevant to legal decisionmaking). 
16. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 
813-32 (1982). 
17. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & 0RG. 441 (1992). 
18. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Un­
packing the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986). 
19. David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by 
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992). For a thoughtful critique, see John M. Rogers, 
"Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 997 (1996) and David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, 
Guidance, and Indeterminancy: A Reply to Professor Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
1069 (1996). 
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3. Stearns's Adaptation of Arrow 's Theorem 
[Vol. 100:1265 
In previous articles, Stearns demonstrated that he is particularly 
adept at articulating and applying the precepts of social choice the­
ory.20 His delineation of the voting paradox in the current book is out­
standing and will be a great resource for anyone seeking to understand 
Condorcet's and Arrow's ideas (pp. 42-52, 81-94). Stearns creatively 
elucidates a number of complicated social choice concepts, making 
them both accessible and interesting. Perhaps his best effort is his 
modern revision of Shakespeare's tale of King Lear to illustrate the 
"empty core" problem.21 
The driving force of Stearns's book is his argument that appellate 
courts, as collective decisionmaking bodies, are governed by Arrow's 
Theorem and therefore are prone to cycling. He presents a group of 
Supreme Court procedural doctrines that he maintains can be ex­
plained and justified as responses to cycling and related social choice 
conundrums. For example, outcome voting, rather than issue voting, 
ensures that the Court will reach a decision even when no stable ma­
jority of justices can agree both on the means (issue) and the ends 
(outcome) in a particular case (pp. 97-111). In instances where only 
outcome voting would lead to a decision, the narrowest grounds doc­
trine offers a fair interpretation of the Court's holding in the case be­
cause it limits the ruling to the position that was at least the second­
best choice of a majority of justices (pp. 124-29). 
Stearns scrutinizes a handful of cases in order to prove that this so­
cial choice account of outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doc­
trine is an accurate positive theory. His reasoning, however, is primar­
ily normative, not explanatory. Most significantly, he does not prove 
that outcome voting developed to respond to cycling problems; in fact, 
he does not offer a historical account for its emergence (although it 
seems an obvious default rule). Rather, Stearns provides a justification 
for keeping the outcome voting rule. The narrowest grounds doctrine 
also appears to have been adopted for largely pragmatic reasons: 
judges do not know ex arite their relative position in future cases, and 
therefore they select a rule that is least likely to be completely con­
trary to their future decisions. Rational choice theory offers the best 
20. See, e.g. , Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: His­
torical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renais­
sance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994). 
21. Pp. 54-58. Cycling can be seen as one instance of the "empty core" phenomenon. A 
bargaining situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core when a partici­
pant may be persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger share and such 
defection changes the majority agreement. 
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explanation for this selection.22 Again, Stearns sets forth a compelling 
rationalization for the narrowest grounds doctrine, but not an explana­
tion for it. 
Stearns correctly argues that the most important rules of constitu­
tional decisionmaking concern "justiciability" - the fitness of a mat­
ter for judicial disposition (pp. 35-38, 157-211). The key doctrine i;! 
standing, which denies federal court access to any plaintiff who cannot 
show an "injury in fact" caused by the defendant that is judicially re­
dressable (pp. 37-38, 160-70). Stearns's most original contribution is to 
apply his social choice approach to standing (Chapters Five and Six). 
He argues that standing is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of 
stare decisis. He contends that the rule of stare decisis is similar to the 
rule of outcome voting in that both respond to the problem of cycling: 
outcome voting addresses cycling within cases, while stare decisis re­
sponds to cycling across cases (pp. 158, 170-77). 
Stare decisis, however, poses its own social choice dilemma, "path 
dependency": parties, particularly organized interests, can manipulate 
the development of substantive legal doctrine by presenting cases in a 
predetermined order and thereby restrain the Court, which is bound 
by its precedent.23 One of Arrow's prerequisites for fair group deci­
sionmaking is that the decision should be independent of the order of 
presentation of alternatives. Stare decisis, coupled with sophisticated 
litigation strategies, violates this requirement. This conclusion under­
girds Stearns's central thesis: that standing doctrine allows the Court 
to impede parties' attempts at path manipulation by making it more 
difficult to present cases on their merits (p. 159). Specifically, standing 
helps ensure that the order in which cases are presented is primarily 
determined not by litigant strategy, but by chance events directly in­
juring plaintiff and beyond her control (pp. 23-24, 157, 159, 162, 177-
80, 198, 204, 208). 
As with outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doctrine, 
Stearns provides a compelling normative justification for stare decisis 
and standing, but his case studies do not persuasively explain the de­
velopment or utilization of these doctrines. A more appealing, direct 
account as to why courts respect precedent is the desire for fairness: 
similarly situated parties should be treated alike. Moreover, consistent 
decisionmaking is a hallmark of rationality and contributes to a court's 
legitimacy. Again, the simple "rational actor" model explains judicial 
22. These two doctrines seem to be instances of the strategic theory of judicial behavior 
as developed in political science, which we wilLdiscuss in the next section. We do not, how­
ever, offer a detailed account of its ability to explain outcome voting or the narrowest 
grounds rule because that would exceed the scope of this Review. 
23. Pp. 177-80. Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund developed this 
test case litigation strategy with great success. See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE, 
CAUCASIANS 0NL Y: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANT CASES (1959). 
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behavior. Indeed, the standing doctrine can be explained by a par­
ticular rational choice theory developed in political science, as de­
scribed below. 
In our view, Stearns's approach does not function well as a positive 
theory because it is not a true model of Supreme Court decisionmak­
ing, in the sense that it is not falsifiable. His theory fails to provide ex 
ante for any potential conditions that, if observed, would refute the 
model. 
4. Some Conclusions About the Social Choice Theory 
Stearns's work on the Supreme Court has been anticipated by so­
cial science studies of majority rule institutions, which focus primarily 
on legislatures. Social scientists have demonstrated that strict majority 
rule in a setting where individuals hold some diversity of viewpoints 
generally does not produce a Condorcet winner.24 Thus, cycling is in­
evitable on a theoretical level when groups make even the simplest 
decision among multidimensional options. Nevertheless, cycling does 
not appear frequently in practice because most majority rule institu­
tions adopt anticycling procedures or include strategic members who 
act in such a way as to offset the cycling problem.25 Or, as may be the 
case with the Supreme Court, the members hold a limited number of 
positions26 and/or are selecting among a smaller or limited range of op­
tions.27 
24. See Linda Cohen, Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J. ECON. 
THEORY 1 (1979); Richard D. McKelvey, General Conditions for Global lntransitivities in 
Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979); Norman Schofield, Instability of 
Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REV. ECON. STUDIES 575 (1978). 
25. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting 
Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 49, 69 (1984). 
Shepsle and Weingast's study provides an important insight to majority rule with open 
agenda setting (i.e., any justice may introduce any alternative at any point in the decision­
making process): If two options are placed on the agenda where one option encompasses the 
other, then the more encompassing option is the sophisticated outcome. Id. at 68-69. A so­
phisticated voter would propose that alternative in order to capture additional votes. 
26. Heterogenity of preferences is a prerequisite to cycling. See, e.g. , BRAMS, supra note 
10, at 41; Frank DeMeyer & Charles R. Plott, The Probability of a Cyclical Majority, 38 
ECONOMETRICA 345, 345 (1970). 
27. It is common to imagine judges selecting along a unidimensional decisional space, as 
one of us has done in her work. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the 
Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). In such a setting, cycling 
does not occur because the judges' relative positions are defined in such a way that the ma­
jority's preferences are transitive. The literature on majority rule cycles is set in the context 
of multidimensional voting space. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Institutionaliz­
ing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 367 
(1982). Judicial process scholars have considered the influence of case complexity on the 
likelihood of justices circulating separate opinions and noted how their finding - a high 
positive relationship - is consistent with Arrow's Theorem regarding the instability of ma­
jorities in multidimensional issue areas. FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 90-91 (2000). 
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Stearns obviously has given much thought and energy to the sub­
tleties of social choice theory and the possibilities that arise by apply­
ing this theory to Supreme Court decisionmaking. The resulting ideas 
are keenly original and innovative. 
The social choice approach, however, does less than Stearns claims 
for it. He presents his account as a metatheory that both provides a 
model of process doctrines and outperforms other models of these 
doctrines. Although Stearns comprehensively analyzes all the perti­
nent decisions, we believe that his theory best explains a group of un­
usual cases rather than the standard doctrines. Political science pro­
vides a stronger, more tractable model of process doctrine generally. 
Stearns's theory may supplement that model, but fails to supplant it. 
B. The Insights of Political Science About Collegial Courts 
1 .  Attitudinal and Strategic Theories of Judicial Behavior 
To answer the question of how judges make decisions, political sci­
entists have developed two competing models: attitudinal and strate­
gic. Both models begin with the recognition. that judges are at core 
human decisionmakers, and rational choice theory tells us that judges, 
like human beings generally, will seek to achieve their goals or prefer­
ences. Thus, both political science models build on the same base as 
the social choice one: the rational actor. 
The attitudinal model posits that a judge seeks to maximize her 
sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes".28 This model has been 
the dominant positive theory of court behavior because empirical 
studies demonstrate that it has substantial explanqtory power.29 Most 
adherents of the model will concede that it does not account for all 
factors in judicial decisionmaking30 and acknowledge that legal rules 
and doctrines have been shown to restrain, and in some instances to 
guide, adjudication.31 But they point out that the attitudinal model is a 
valuable tool for explaining and predicting judicial behavior. 
Strategic theorists argue that the attitudinal model can be im­
proved without unnecessarily complicating it or detracting from its 
28. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (offering a detailed delineation and defense of the attitu­
dinal model). 
29. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionrnaking on U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1646-55 (1998) (detailing the evolution and status 
of the attitudinal model); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325-26 (1992) (considering the relevance of 
legal factors to the attitudinal account). See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 28. 
30. In fact, models are inherently incomplete, a simplified and useful construct of real­
ity. A "model" that included every characteristic of the object of study would not be a model 
but would rather be the thing itself. 
31. See, e.g. , George & Epstein, supra note 29. 
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predictive ability.32 Strategic theories of judicial behavior adopt the at­
titudinalist position that justices seek to achieve policy goals but claim 
that justices, in order to accomplish this end, must and do consider the 
preferences and likely conduct of other relevant actors. Hence, strate­
gic theorists emphasize the influence of strategic factors, such as inter­
actions with colleagues on the court (internal dynamics) or reactions 
of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the President 
(exogenous constraints).33 Such strategic considerations are absent 
from Arrow's Theorem. Arrow assumed that preferences were not af­
fected by the decisionmaking process, and he therefore ignored strate­
gic (or game) aspects of the process that would prevent someone from 
voting his or her true, or sincere, preference.34 Relaxing either or both 
assumptions - as the strategic theory of judicial process does -: will 
prevent cycling. 
· 2. An Attitudinal Account of Standing Doctrine 
A major aspect of Stearns's work is his positive explanation for the 
development of the standing doctrine, which assertedly harmonizes 
most of the relevant cases and thereby improves on existing theories 
(Chapter Six). In our view, however, the attitudinal model provides a 
simpler, more intuitive explanation for standing decisions. It can ac­
count for the Supreme Court justices' votes on standing by reference 
to their preference to favor. or disfavor sociopolitical underdogs. Lib­
eral justices are far more likely than their conservative counterparts to 
grant standing to those who are of disadvantaged social or economic 
status, such as the poor, ethnic minorities, employees, and criminals. 
Conversely, conservative justices are more likely than their liberal 
colleagues to confer standing on the powerful. 
Consider, for example, the New Deal and Burger Court decisions 
that adopted very strict standing requirements. Stearns deems these 
cases surprising because of the two Courts' contrasting policy prefer­
ences.35 As we will detail in Part II, the Court created standing in the 
32. See, e.g. , LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Forrest Maltzman & Paul 
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996). 
33. See Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial 
Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making (providing an 
articulate primer on, and argument for, strategic theory) in SUPREME COURT DECISION­
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell w. Clayton & Howard Gillman 
eds., 1999). 
34. ARROW, supra note 3, at 6-8. 
35. Pp. 35-38. One of the problems with Stearns's explanation of the standing decisions 
is that the rules he vaunts are merely what the Court allows us to see of its decisionmaking 
processes, the great majority of which are entirely secret. It is hard to conceive of these rules, 
then, as meaningful constraints on judicial behavior when most of that behavior is veiled and 
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1930s and 1940s primarily to deny federal judicial access to businesses 
challenging progressive legislation.36 By contrast, the Burger Court 
used standing mainly to foreclose litigation by disadvantaged groups 
attacking conservative statutes.37 Nonetheless, the New Deal and 
Burger Courts did share an important feature: both wanted to protect 
other governmental actors. Access doctrines like standing allow the 
Court to deny relief to those seeking to challenge existing political 
power arrangements. Thus, the Court's treatment of standing is irre­
trievably linked to its position on those with access to power in the 
first instance. 
Moreover, Stearns's process theory is unnecessarily complex. The 
attitudinal • model explains both the New Deal and the 
Burger/Rehnquist Courts' reliance on standing to protect liberal and 
conservative legislation, respectively. The attitudinal approach does so 
with less complexity than a social choice model. Stearns does not 
achieve greater overall success in predicting Court behavior. If a sim­
ple paradigm explains the observed events as accurately as a more 
complicated and less obvious approach, then the former should be 
preferred.38 While it is true that humari behavior is complex, it need 
not be made more so. 
Admittedly, Stearns's process model improves upon existing mod­
els of judicial behavior by adding to them and creating a more com­
plete theory. Therefore, social choice is not "the" explanation, but 
rather is part of several complementary theories (including the attitu­
dinal one) that can account for the observed outcomes. Hence, when 
combined, these approaches result .in a multidimensional, fully real-
the part we see is carefully choreographed to ensure the appearance of principled decision­
making. 
36. See infra Section 11.B.l. 
37. For example, the Burger Court held that plaintiffs must establish a direct relation­
ship between the challenged action and a personal injury and must show that the requested 
remedy will redress that injury. This requirement prevented blacks from challenging alleg­
edly discriminatory police practices, see, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and 
restrictive zoning ordinances in white neighborhoods, see, e.g. , Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975), as well as the poor from contesting government welfare procedures, see, e.g. , Simon 
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
38. Clearly, this is the principle of Occam's Razor. Isaac Newton stated as his first rule 
of philosophizing: "That there ought not be admitted any more causes of natural things than 
those which are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena." ISAAC NEWTON, 
PRINCIPIA: THE SYSTEM OF THE WORLD, reprinted in DANA DENSMORE, NEWTON'S 
PRINCIPIA: THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT: TRANSLATION, NOTES, AND EXPANDED PROOFS 
241 (1995) (translations and diagrams by William H. Donohue). As Stephen Hawking ex­
plains: "It seems better to employ the principle of economy known as Occam's razor and cut 
out all the features of the theory which cannot be observed." STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 55 (1988). 
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ized model of judicial behavior that no model alone can capture.39 We 
will now explore other theories that further enrich our understanding. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND HISTORY 
A. The Social Choice Approach to Standing 
1. Professor Stearns's Conception of Standing 
Stearns presents a novel theoretical and historical account of 
standing. He begins with Steven Winter's definitive history of this doc­
trine, which posits that the liberal Supreme Court developed standing 
to prevent attacks on progressive legislation that began with the New 
Deal and continued with the Great Society.40 Professor Steams asks a 
penetrating question: Why did the conservative Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts, which distrust government regulation, retain and strengthen 
standing doctrine instead of abandoning or limiting it (pp. 35-38, 167-
68)? 
He finds the answer in social choice theory: through standing, the 
Court has consistently rejected attempts to conduct litigation on an 
ideological basis, whether liberal or conservative (pp. 159, 162-64, 168-
70, 198, 204-11).  Steams sees standing as operating on two levels. 
First, as noted above, standing improves fairness by reducing the 
ability of interest groups to manipulate the evolution of legal doctrine 
by controlling the order of case decisions - a "path dependency" that 
results from stare decisis (pp. 157-62, 177-80, 190-91, 198, 204, 208-11).  
The accidental occurrence of an individualized injury, not lawyerly 
calculation, largely determines when a federal court grants access.41 
Second, standing promotes separation of powers by minimizing at­
tempts to force judicial creation of positive law where Congress has 
remained silent, thereby protecting its power to leave legal issues un­
decided until a legislative consensus has formed (pp. 158-59, 164-66, 
198, 201, 209). Standing thus helps to preserve the fundamental consti­
tutional structural distinction between legislative and judicial law­
making processes (pp. 159-60, 198-211). Congress has power to create 
(or decline to create) law as it sees fit, to aggregate preferences, and to 
control the timing and scope of its legislation (pp. 159, 201-02). By 
contrast, courts fashion law only on an ad hoc basis when necessary to 
decide an actual case, and they are limited to applying legal principles 
rather than personal preferences (pp. 201-03). 
39. Social scientists have observed that some law and economics scholars mistakenly 
believe that they must present a theory that beats other theories and exists instead of those 
theories. Such an approach is both unscientific and incomplete. 
40. Pp. 35-37, 167. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of 
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
41. See supra Section l.A.3. 
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Stearns characterizes "injury" as a metaphor to describe when for­
tuitous circumstances have harmed a plaintiff seriously enough to jus­
tify shifting the burden of legislative inertia and allowing a court to 
formulate positive law (pp. 204-11,  257-59, 262-65, 268-69). Accord­
ingly, standing enables doctrine to evolve more fairly and consistently 
with the "majoritarian norm" of democratic lawmaking (p. 300). 
Stearns applies this social choice theory to the three main catego­
ries of standing cases. First, he endorses the precedent prohibiting 
third party standing as promoting fairness and reducing manipulation 
(pp. 162-64, 249-50, 259-69). One illustration is the Court's denial to 
the Sierra Club of the right to claim that a construction project had 
violated federal environmental laws because the Club failed to allege 
that its members actually had used the national park that would be 
negatively affected by the building.42 Stearns concludes that the Court 
correctly held that a park patron, rather than a special interest group, 
would be the appropriate plaintiff (pp. 263-66, 277-78). He therefore 
rejects the scholarly consensus that Sierra Club invented a pleading 
technicality to express the majority's political antipathy towards envi-
ronmentalists.43 
· 
Second, Stearns contends that the Court's ban on "generalized 
grievances" ensures fairness by forcing the most majoritarian depart­
ment to deal with illegal government conduct that produces diffuse 
harms, rather than allowing ideological litigants to commandeer the 
least representative branch to make positive law (pp. 250, 269-71 ). He 
asserts, for example, that the Court properly denied standing to "tax­
payers" and "citizens" who claimed that (1) a statute authorizing se­
cret CIA spending violated the Constitution's requirement that 
Congress provide a public accounting;44 (2) Representatives' simulta­
neous membership in the military reserves ignored a constitutional 
prohibition on such dual service;45 and (3) the government's grant of 
property to a religious institution ran afoul of the Establishment 
42. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
43. Pp. 263-66. Stearns emphasizes that the Sierra Club did not invoke any specific fed­
eral statute whose violation had harmed them in a way that conferred standing, but rather 
merely claimed to be "adversely affected" by agency action under the catch-all standing pro­
vision of the Administrative Procedures Act. Pp. 259, 263-66, 268-69. He contrasts United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), in which 
the plaintiffs relied upon the National Environmental Policy Act, which broadly granted 
standing. Pp. 264-66. A denial of standing may have left the statute unenforceable by any­
one, whereas in Sierra Club, park users could still have brought suit. Pp. 265-66. 
44. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see also id. at 179 (declaring 
that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to 
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ulti­
mately to the political process"). 
45. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
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Clause.46 Steams argues that the alleged constitutional violations in 
these three cases did not directly harm any particular citizen in a man­
ner substantial enough to warrant a grant of standing and thus an as­
sumption by courts of lawmaking power (pp. 168-69, 269-70) . Again, 
he questions the prevailing wisdom that these cases simply reflected 
hostility toward antiwar activists and strict separationists (pp. 167-69, 
233, 269-70) . 
Third, Steams characterizes standing's "causation" and "redress­
ability" prongs as shorthand for denying anyone the right to allege 
that unlawful government conduct has created a market distortion, the 
removal of which will benefit the plaintiff (pp. 250, 271-79). For in­
stance, in Allen v. Wright,41 the Court conceded that IRS tax exemp­
tions to discriminatory private schools had constitutionally injured 
black public school children by diminishing their ability to receive an 
integrated education.48 Nonetheless, the majority denied standing be­
cause the plaintiffs had not shown that the IRS, as distinguished from 
the private schools and their parental supporters, had caused their in­
jury.49 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were making a general 
complaint about an executive agency's internal program.50 Steams 
agrees that citizens should ask the political branches, not the courts, to 
eliminate market distortions such as the one created by the IRS ex­
emption (pp. 32-35, 271-77, 279). 
2. A General Critique of the Social Choice Approach 
Steams's theory has considerable explanatory power. Nonetheless, 
it rests upon two debatable premises. 
The first is that the Court applies standing in a relatively apolitical 
manner to repel all ideological litigants. If this is true, however, why 
did the Warren Court in Flast v. Cohen51 break with ironclad prece­
dent and allow taxpayers to claim that congressional spending for 
church-run schools violated the Establishment Clause? Was it not for 
the transparent purpose of furthering the Court's liberal agenda of 
ending public support for religion? Conversely, didn't the Burger 
Court serve conservative political ends (and eviscerate Flast) by re­
jecting the standing of taxpayers to question the federal government's 
46. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Arns. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
47. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
48. Id. at 756. 
49. Id. at 757-59. 
50. Id. at 760-61. 
.51. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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grant of property to a Christian college?52 Similarly, why was the 
Court in the 1950s and 1960s so solicitous of minorities, whereas by 
the 1970s and 1980s it was denying standing to blacks and Latinos who 
alleged unconstitutional discrimination in taxation53 and housing poli­
cies?54 Finally, why have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts routinely 
rejected the standing of those who seek to protect the environment,55 
but not those who wish to degrade it?56 
Although Stearns plausibly answers such questions through com­
plex social choice analysis, most scholars have a simpler explanation 
- partisan politics.57 While conceding the force of such political argu­
ments, Steams astutely points out thatthey cannot account for several 
anomalies in the standing cases or explain why this doctrine has per­
sisted despite the Court's shift from predominantly Democratic to 
Republican appointees (pp. 216, 280-81). For instance, crass politics 
should have led the "law and order" Burger and Rehnquist Courts to 
shut the federal courthouse doors to accused and convicted criminals, 
yet the opposite has occurred. The reason, Stearns says, is that crimi­
nals are not ideologues trying to manipulate the evolution of legal doc­
trine, but rather are alleging the most serious kind of individual injury 
- that they will be unlawfully imprisoned or executed.58 In any event, 
52. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (summarizing Valley 
Forge). 
53. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also supra notes 47-50 and accompa­
nying text (examining Allen). 
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
55. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed supra notes 42-43 and ac­
companying text; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (invalidating 
Congress's grant of standing to "any person" to enforce the Endangered Species Act); infra 
notes 70-72 and accompanying text (analyzing Lujan). 
56. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (allowing developers to sue a gov­
ernment agency that prevented them from proceeding in order to safeguard endangered 
species); Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (conferring stand­
ing on homeowners who challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute limiting the li­
ability of nuclear power plants, and upholding this law). 
57. See, e.g. , Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 659 (1985) ("One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing standing's 
agenda with that of the New Right."). Instead of accusing federal courts of consciously en­
gaging in raw politics, attitudinal theorists suggest that judges' political backgrounds influ­
ence their decisionmaking in empirically demonstrable ways, regardless of whether they are 
aware of this fact. 
58. Pp. 163-64, 203-04, 262-63, 273-74. Stearns distinguishes those few decisions that 
seem to hold to the contrary. For example, he maintains that in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 
1012 (1976), the Court properly declined to permit Gary Gilmore's mother to allege that his 
conviction and death penalty were unconstitutional, because the son alone had standing to 
raise these claims and thereby force the Court to create constitutional law. Pp. 168, 179, 205-
07, 209, 250, 256-58, 260, 264. Similarly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), 
the Court would have allowed Lyons to sue for damages resulting from the police depart­
ment's application of a dangerous "choke hold" to him, but correctly denied him standing to 
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he criticizes political explanations as "nonfalsifiable": one cannot 
prove or disprove hidden motives that are not expressed in opinions 
(pp. 280-81).  
But standing decisions do reflect, if not partisan politics, a broader 
political theory. Indeed, that theory forms Stearns's second premise: 
the Constitution imposes strict standing requirements because our 
democracy requires minimal judicial interference with the political 
branches. We submit, on the contrary, that standing sabotages the 
constitutional will of "We the People," who authorized the federal ju­
diciary to check Congress and the President so that they neither ex­
ceed their delegated powers nor violate anyone's constitutional 
rights.59 Before developing this thesis further, however, we will first at­
tempt to refute Stearns's argument that the historical evidence sup­
ports his social choice theory of standing. 
B. The History of Standing 
1 .  The New Deal Era 
Stearns's version of events may be summarized as follows. By 1941, 
President Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the justices, who 
agreed doctrinally on two critical constitutional issues: the validity of 
the New Deal and the incorrectness of the substantive due process ju­
risprudence epitomized in Lochner v. New Yorll'° (pp. 220-22, 228-29). 
The emerging liberal Court developed standing to foreclose attacks on 
progressive legislation in the reactionary lower federal courts, which 
would have sustained such challenges and thereby compelled the 
Supreme Court to issue substantive constitutional rulings (pp. 36-37, 
226-28). These holdings would have differed radically from those of 
the preceding era, which had sharply limited the power of Congress 
and the states to address social and economic ills (pp. 226-29). Such 
wholesale reversals would have exacted a high political cost, exposing 
the Court as nakedly partisan and damaging its credibility and per­
ceived impartiality (p. 226). 
We are skeptical of Stearns's account of New Deal history for two 
reasons. First, from 1937 to 1942, the justices had no qualms about ex-
request an injunction (and thereby raise constitutional claims) on behalf of unknown future 
choke hold victims. Pp. 168, 204-07, 209, 256, 258, 260. 
59. This argument has been fleshed out in Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Sepa­
ration of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) [hereinafter 
Pushaw, Justiciability]. 
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Stearns acknowledges that the Court eventually became split on 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should be interpreted as incor­
porating the entire Bill of Rights against the states (the Black/Douglas position) or only 
those rights that were fundamental (the Frankfurter view). Pp. 229-30. Nonetheless, he 
stresses that this division was bipolar, and that therefore the justices could predict the out­
come of any particular case. P. 230. 
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plicitly rejecting the substantive constitutional decisions of even their 
very recent predecessors.61 For example, the Court repudiated long­
established limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause62 
and decades of substantive <;lue process cases that had thwarted state 
economic legislation.63 The Court paid little political price for this 
about-face because the vast majority of Americans (and the political 
officials they elected) supported this trend. Moreover, any resulting 
institutional costs to the Court (e.g., being perceived as applying po­
litical rather than legal principles) seem to have been far less than the 
damage to its prestige caused by the intransigence of the conservative . 
justices in the early 1930s. 
Second, Steams argues that, without standing, the reactionary fed­
eral district and appellate judges would have cleverly distinguished the 
Supreme Court's new decisions on substantive constitutional law 
(pp. 226-28). In particular, they would have struck down progressive 
legislation that the Court had not yet specifically considered, thereby 
forcing its hand. But we think the justices would have been unwise to 
choose standing as the principal tool to discipline lower federal courts. 
If these sly Neanderthal judges could distinguish the Court's seemingly 
unequivocal substantive holdings, why could they not also manipulate 
the Court's new standing doctrine - which was largely discretionary 
and very malleable - to grant plaintiffs access and rule on the mer­
its?64 Steams leaves this question unanswered.65 
61. Stearns recognizes this phenomenon, pp. 218, 221-26, but not its tendency to under­
mine his thesis. 
62. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing Congress to regulate a 
farmer's growth of wheat for personal consumption, despite previous cases holding that 
"commerce" did not include production and that Congress could not reach activity that oc­
curred entirely within a state); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(sustaining the National Labor Relations Act by overruling an unbroken line of precedent 
which had established that labor was not a matter of interstate commerce). For a detailed 
analysis of the New Deal Court's overhaul of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Grant S. 
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles 
to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 79-83 (1999); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the 
Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 715-16 (2002). 
63. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state mini­
mum wage law even though the Court had struck down a virtually identical statute the year 
before as a violation of employers' substantive due process right to freedom of contract). 
64. Again, Stearns acknowledges the prudential and flexible nature of standing, pp. 4, 
30, 161-62, but not its negative implications for his argument. 
65. A complete explanation would require an intensive study of lower federal court 
cases from that era. Thus, Stearns's claims are not supported by adequate empirical evi­
dence. 
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2. The Warren Court 
Almost everyone agrees that the Warren Court relaxed standing to 
facilitate implementation of its liberal agenda.66 First, its activist crea­
tion of new constitutional rights would have been hollow without 
plaintiffs to enforce them, especially those who had no real remedy in 
the political branches (such as minorities and criminal defendants). 
Second, the Court sought to effectuate Great Society legislation, al­
lowing Congress to authorize statutory enforcement by plaintiffs who 
had suffered generalized harms with no common law antecedent (e.g., 
the right to a clean environment or to live in an integrated commu­
nity). 
Stearns accepts this account, but uses social choice theory to com­
plement it (pp. 231-34). He contends that, because a solid majority on 
the Warren Court shared a liberal ideology (with at most bipolar divi­
sions on a few issues), the justices could accurately predict how critical 
legal questions would be defined and resolved (p. 232). Again, al­
though social choice provides a fresh perspective, the obvious political 
explanation seems to us to be the better one. 
3. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
Stearns demonstrates that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts split 
into three camps: (1) liberal holdovers like Brennan and Marshall, 
later joined by Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; (2) conser­
vatives such as Burger, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who would 
overrule precedent they deemed incorrect; and (3) pragmatic moder­
ates who were generally committed to precedent (e.g., White, Stewart, 
Powell, O'Connor, and Kennedy) (pp. 219-20, 234-38). The justices 
could not be sure that, in codifying their preferred legal outcomes in 
case decisions, the will of the present majority would be reflected 
(pp. 239-44). For instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,67 Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy voted to uphold Roe v. Wade68 on stare deci­
sis grounds, even though their previously expressed position was that 
Roe had been wrongly decided (pp. 16-23, 129-30). 
According to Stearns, the justices often concluded that because 
they could not predict the result, it was better not to risk deciding the 
merits (p. 244). Furthermore, as always, the Court could use standing 
to foster democratic lawmaking by thwarting ideological litigants who 
wanted to create positive law that lacked current legislative support 
(pp. 239, 244). 
66. The following summary draws on Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 464. 
67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Stearns's analysis ingeniously reveals why the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts not only reaffirmed, but actually expanded, the 
standing doctrine developed by their liberal forebears.69 Unfortu­
nately, however, he cannot explain perhaps the most significant 
standing case of the past half century, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.7° 
There the Court struck down a provision of the Endangered Species 
Act authorizing "any person" to sue to enjoin federal agencies from 
violating that statute.71 Justice Scalia maintained that Article III 
banned such "generalized grievances" that the government had failed 
to comply with the law, and instead limited federal courts to vindicat­
ing the rights of individuals.72 
Under Stearns's model, however, the Court should have deferred 
to Congress's exercise of its legislative power to affirmatively create 
law (to protect endangered species) and to determine who best could 
enforce that law (private citizens).73 For the same reason, Stearns can­
not justify Bennett v. Spear,74 which granted standing under the same 
Endangered Species Act "citizen suit" provision to developers who 
claimed economic harm when the government invoked that Act to 
halt their project.75 The Court thus has flouted an express statutory di­
rective by denying standing to those attempting to preserve endan­
gered species, yet welcoming entrepreneurs who want to harm such 
creatures. 
Stearns concedes that Lujan and Bennett undercut his thesis 
that the Court takes an apolitical, nonideological approach to standing 
in order to preserve Congress's ability to make laws reflecting 
majoritarian preferences (pp. 271 ,  281-93). Despite these and a 
few other unruly cases, however, he contends that his social choice 
69. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 467, 475-76 (describing the Burger 
Court's addition of two Article III requirements, causation and redressability). Social choice 
theory also clarifies certain seeming anomalies in the standing cases, such as the conservative 
Court's liberal grant of access to criminal defendants. See supra notes 57-58 and accompa­
nying text. Social choice analysis here is superior to an attitudinalist or political model, which 
would likely predict that conservative justices would restrict the standing of criminals. 
Alternatively, however, this jurisprudence might reflect the conservative abhorrence to 
government overreaching, which has the most devastating individual consequences in the 
criminal area. Thus, the Court may be willing to confer standing generously for the purpose 
of monitoring law enforcement officials to guarantee core liberties, although it will give 
those officials considerable latitude. Concededly, sensitivity to criminal procedural rights has 
not been a hallmark of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 
70. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
71. Id. at 558-59, 571-73 (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536). 
72. Id. at 573-78. 
73. The plaintiffs in Lujan were not trying to persuade the Court to make positive law in 
an area where Congress had chosen not to act; rather, they were simply asking the Court to 
apply a law that Congress had passed. Id. at 559. 
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
75. Id. at 175. 
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paradigm makes sense of more precedent than any other approach 
(pp. 281,  301). We, on the other hand, believe that one political theory 
can explain nearly every standing case. 
· 
C. A Competing Model of Standing 
The Court has always defended its standing decisions as dictated 
by the Constitution's creation of a democracy with a uniquely limited 
judiciary.76 This idea traces to Progressive scholars like Woodrow 
Wilson, who argued that the American Constitution, with its emphasis 
on checks and balances, inhibited the effective governance that mod­
ern conditions demanded.77 Instead, these intellectuals championed 
the English parliamentary system, which featured a unified legisla­
tive/executive "sovereign" (i.e., a plenary lawmaking authority) unen­
cumbered by judicial review of statutes.78 
Depression era politicians largely adopted this approach, as 
President Roosevelt and Congress worked hand-in-hand to craft the 
New Deal, but federal judges often invalidated this legislation.79 Felix 
Frankfurter solved this problem by creating - and persuading his 
fellow justices to adopt - a standing doctrine that incorporated the 
Wilsonian notion that the judiciary should avoid interfering with the 
sovereign political branches.80 JUstice Frankfurter did not, however, 
candidly acknowledge that he was responding to the practical reality 
of a vastly expanded federal government that might generate an un­
manageable volume of litigation. Rather, he insisted that his approach 
implemented the Constitution's text, history, precedent, and political 
theory.81 
Justice Frankfurter asserted that Article III reinforced basic 
separation-of-powers principles by restricting standing in federal court 
76. See, e.g. , Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,  19-26 (1998) (supporting this 
proposition by citing numerous standing cases from the Hughes, Stone, Vinson, Warren, 
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts). 
77. See, e.g. , WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885) and 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STA TES (1908). 
78. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 7-11 ,  34-35, 84-86, 222, 252-61 (1991) (de­
scribing this concept of "monistic democracy"). 
79. Most ominously, the Court struck down the centerpiece of the New Deal, the Na­
tional Industrial Recovery Act, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935). 
80. His seminal opinion is in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-70 (1939) (Frank­
furter, J., concurring). The full Court definitively embraced Justice Frankfurter's approach 
in Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. , 342 U.S. 429 (1952). For a discussion of Frankfurter's singular 
influence on modern standing doctrine, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 447, 452-53 (1994). 
81. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Joint Anti­
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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to those who could demonstrate an "injury."82 Determining whether a 
plaintiff had suffered a cognizable "injury" depended upon the sub­
stantive law he invoked. 
As to statutes, Justice Frankfurter urged judicial deference to 
Congress's judgment about who was "injured."83 Hence, Congress had 
sole power to define substantive rights (including novel ones with no 
common law analogue) and to decide which persons could vindicate 
those rights judicially - government agencies, individuals whose pri­
vate law rights had been directly invaded by the alleged violation of 
the statute, citizens acting as private attorneys general, or some com­
bination.84 Conversely, if Congress had not conferred standing in a 
particular statute, and the plaintiff instead relied upon the 
Administrative Procedure Act's general provision allowing suit by 
those "adversely affected" by an agency's action, the Court would 
deny standing unless the plaintiff credibly alleged a personal injury of 
the sort recognized by property, tort, or contract law.85 
Although the foregoing approach comported with the original con­
stitutional design,86 Justice Frankfurter went awry when he extended 
his test for implied statutory standing - individualized, common law 
injury - to all claims arising under the Constitution.87 Such a test (and 
a corresponding prohibition on third party standing) might be defensi­
ble as applied to those constitutional clauses guaranteeing individual 
rights,88 but certainly not to those that either protect collective rights 
82. See, e.g., Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also 
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 149-52, 157-60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
83. For an insightful analysis of the evolution of this approach to statutory standing, see 
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 36-37 (1978). 
84. For example, the Court upheld the Communications Act of 1934, which authorized 
citizens to sue to vindicate "the public interest in communications," even if they had no "pri­
vate rights" at stake. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942) 
(Frankfurter, J., for the Court). 
85. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also McGrath, 341 
U.S. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This aspect of Justice Frankfurter's analysis incor­
porated existing precedent. See, e.g. , Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-
38 (1939). Steams nicely summarizes the Court's new approach to standing. Pp. 227-29. 
86. Separation of powers demands that federal courts respect Congress's policy deter­
mination about how the legal rights it has created can be enforced most effectively. Thus, for 
example, from the beginning of the Republic, Congress has allowed standing to citizens gen­
erally to bring various "public actions" to ensure the government's compliance with the law. 
See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 481-83. 
87. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (contending that, in 
the absence of an express congressional grant of standing, the plaintiff had to show an indi­
vidualized injury to a private legal interest in order to pursue an action under a federal stat­
ute or the Constitution); see also Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460, 464, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., con­
curring) (to similar effect). 
88. Such an approach promotes liberty by allowing the person whose constitutional 
rights have been infringed to decide whether or not to litigate. If at least one potential plain­
tiff has the ability to enforce a constitutional provision protecting individual rights, that 
clause remains viable, and the government will be deterred from violating it. Conversely, the 
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(such as the Establishment Clause) or structure the government (e.g., 
most of Articles I and 11).89 To say that no one has standing to vindi­
cate these collective or structural provisions, unless perhaps Congress 
specifically lets them, turns the Constitution on its head.90 
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter and his current judicial disciples have 
failed to grasp that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution shifted 
sovereignty from the government to "the People;" who ·delegate cer­
tain powers to their representatives in all three government depart­
ments.91 Thus, the federal courts' power is coextensive with - not in­
ferior to - that of Congress and the President.92 ·. Similarly, the 
Constitution limits all three branches, not just the judiciary.93 More­
over, federal judges are not unrepresentative because they are 
unelected. Rather, the People removed judges from the electoral pro­
cess to ensure their independence in representing the People through 
the exercise of judicial power, especially by upholding the 
Constitution against transient majoritarian pressures.94 Thus, federal 
particularized injury requirement prevents meddlers from asserting the individual constitu­
tional rights of those who choose not to press them. For elaborations of this argument, see 
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" 
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306-10 (1979); Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 
486. 
. 
89. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 485-87. 
90. The claim that Congress alone can authorize standing to enforce the Constitution 
assumes that the political branches have power to preclude judicial review over their own 
actions that allegedly violate the Constitution. A central reason that "the People" adopted a 
written Constitution establishing an independent judiciary, however, was that the political 
branches cannot be trusted to impartially interpret restrictions on their own authority. See 
Pusha'w, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 485-88. 
91 . The pathbreaking history on the development and implications of popular sover­
eignty is GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
259-63, 272-83, 291-343, 362-63, 372-89, 453-63, 530-53, 596-609 (1969). For a discussion of 
the influence of Wood and other intellectual historians on constitutional Jaw scholars, see 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John " Letters: Advi­
sory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 495-96 (1998). 
92. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A 
Defense of the Nev-Federalist Interpretation of Article Ill, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 895-96 
(agreeing with Akhil Amar that this "coextensiveness principle" was an axiom of Federalist 
political thought); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 397-99, 415-19, 427, 451, 
469-72, 478 (arguing that the modern Court's approach to justiciability undermines the coor­
dinate role of the judicial branch). 
93. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 397-98, 411, 425-27, 467-69, 478, 485. 
94. Hamilton made this precise argument in THE FEDERALIST No. 78. He crystallized 
an idea that had been evolving over the previous decade, as documented in WOOD, supra 
note 91, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 383-89, 453-63, 549; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 823, 
826-28 (2001) (describing the Federalist precept that independent federal judges represent 
the People through adjudication, especially by reviewing constitutional claims); Pushaw, 
Justiciability, supra note 59, at 398-99, 411, 420-25, 455, 467-69, 478 (contending that standing 
and similar jurisdictional doctrines ignore this principle). 
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courts must "interfere" with (i.e., check) the political branches when 
they exceed the constitutional powers granted to them by the People.95 
In short, the Frankfurter-inspired standing doctrine frustrates 
separation of powers by allowing federal courts to abdicate their 
role of enforcing the Constitution: For present purposes, however, 
it does not matter whether the political theory underlying standing 
is right or wrong. The relevant point is that the Court has consistently 
implemented this theory: that judicial review is presumptively 
illegitimate because federal courts are peculiarly "limited" in our 
separation-of-powers scheme compared to the "democratic" political 
branches, and that this presumption can be rebutted only by a plaintiff 
who can demonstrate an individualized injury caused by the defen­
dant. 
Indeed, the only. major standing case that does not fit this model is 
Flast v. Cohen.96 There, the Warren Court permitted taxpayers to 
claim that the federal government's support for religious schools vio­
lated the Establishment Clause, even though no individual taxpayer 
could show an injury distinct from that suffered by all citizens.97 Inter­
estingly, however, the Court did not set forth the new concept of 
separation of powers that apparently drove its decision: that aggres­
sive checking of the political branches to protect constitutional rights 
(broadly defined) outweighed the' efficiency interest of the political 
branches in acting without judicial interference.98 Rather, the Court 
purported to do nothing more than follow the established "limited ju­
diciary" rationale of standing.99 
Consequently, it was easy for the Burger Court to revive the 
Frankfurterian notion of English constitutionalism, both in rhetoric 
and in reality. Indeed, every Burger Court standing decision reflects 
this idea, which was nicely encapsulated in Allen v. Wright:100 standing 
"define[s] with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of 
powers on which the Federal Government is founded," and thus re­
flects " 'concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of 
the courts in a democratic society.' "101 
As to constitutional claims, the Burger Court emasculated Flast in 
the Valley Forge case, which denied taxpayers standing under the 
Establishment Clause because they had alleged a generalized griev­
ance that the government had violated the Constitution, not a per-
95. See id. at 398-99, 432, 469, 478, 485-89. 
96. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
97. Id. at 91-106. 
98. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 464. 
99. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 92-95, 97, 101. 
100. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
101. Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). 
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sonal "common law" injury resulting from such unlawful conduct.102 
Similarly, in Richardson103 and Schlesinger,104 the Court ruled that no 
plaintiff could demonstrate a unique harm flowing from Congress's 
violation of Article I's provisions requiring a public accounting of all 
expenditures and prohibiting Congressmen from serving at the same 
time in the executive branch.105 By contrast, the Court granted stand­
ing to criminal petitioners who alleged that unconstitutional conduct 
by law enforcement officials had directly injured them, but not to third 
parties who were unaffected by the government's actions.106 
Turning to statutory standing, the Burger Court followed Justice 
Frankfurter's script to the · letter. For . example, it deferred to 
Congress's decision to confer broad standing to vindicate the Fair 
Housing Act, which created a novel "right" - a right to live in an in­
tegrated community - that had no common law analogue.107 Con­
versely, if Congress had not specifically granted such widespread 
standing, the justices prudentially declined to infer it.108 
The Rehnquist Court has continued the restrictive approach to 
standing to raise constitutional claims.109 As to statutory standing, the 
Court has sometimes departed from Justice Frankfurter's precise 
analysis, but not from his underlying constitutional theory. If, as 
Frankfurter asserted, the Constitution requires an individualized in­
jury, then Congress cannot grant broader standing, any more than it 
can pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. Under this reason­
ing, the Court in Lujan properly refused to countenance such an un­
constitutional statute, even though its predecessors had mistakenly 
102. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Arns. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
103. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
104. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
105. Cases like Valley Forge, Richardson, and Schlesinger effectively delete the constitu­
tional clauses at issue. The political branches refuse to obey them, the judiciary declines to 
enforce them, and the political remedy of voting is useless because the majority of citizens 
do not care if the government violates these constitutional provisions. See Pushaw, Justi­
ciability, supra note 59, at 487-89. 
106. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
107. In Traf icante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972), the Court 
permitted "testers" with no interest in obtaining housing to claim that a company had vio­
lated the Fair Housing Act by racially discriminating in conveying information about this 
housing. For similar holdings, see Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982); 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977). 
108. See, e.g. , Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
109. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 (1997) (reaffirming the Court's "in­
sist[ence] on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement [i.e., of a par­
ticularized personal injury]," which is applied in an "especially rigorous" manner to constitu­
tional attacks on a coordinate federal branch). 
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done so out of misguided deference to Congress.11° Conversely, 
Bennett v. Spear111 correctly found standing because the developers 
alleged that they had personally suffered economic loss - the quintes­
sential common law injury.112 
In short, the Rehnquist Court has taken Justice Frankfurter's 
premises to their logical extreme. The Court believes that it is faith­
fully adhering to the Constitution's command that the "inferior" and 
"limited" federal judiciary must leave the "sovereign" and "demo­
cratic" political branches undisturbed, even if they are violating the 
law, unless they happen to cause someone a traditional kind of injury. 
This theory undergirds nearly every modem standing decision. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Maxwell Stearns asks that his book be judged on two levels. First, 
he declares that his social choice analysis should be deemed a success 
if it contributes to our understanding of the Supreme Court's deci­
sionmaking process and its implications for the evolution of constitu­
tional doctrine (pp. 216-17). Second, Steams asserts that his model is 
better than all the others, in the sense that it explains more data, in­
cluding anomalies that no other theory can rationalize (pp. 217, 279-
81 ). 
We are not quite persuaded by this second, bolder claim. 
Nonetheless, Stearns has convinced us that any serious constitutional 
law scholar must consider his social choice theory in formulating cri­
tiques based on doctrine, history, politics, or any other discipline. In 
this respect, he has made an original, important, and enduring contri­
bution to the study of constitutional law. 
110. If the judiciary's constitutional role is solely to vindicate individual rights, then 
Justice Scalia is correct that neither the Constitution nor Congress can force federal courts to 
hear general claims that the government has not followed the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992). Again, we are arguing here that the Court has logically 
applied a single political theory in its standing cases, not that we agree with this theory. In­
deed, the Lujan Court ignored two centuries of American history authorizing public law ac­
tions to ensure the government's compliance with the law, which in turn incorporated an­
cient English practices. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 483-85. 
111 .  520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
112. Id. at 167-68, 176-77. 
